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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FUNERAL DIRECTORS & 
EMBALMERS ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
corporation, on behalf of its members, and 
on behalf of others similarly situated, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
MEMORIAL GARDENS OF THE 
VALLEY, INC., a Utah corporation; 
LAKE HILLS, a Utah corporation; 
MEMORIAL TRUST, INC., a Utah 
corporation; AULTOREST MEMORIAL 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; 
HAL S. BENNETT, DONALD HACKING 
and RAYMOND W. GEE, members of the 
Business Regulation Commission of the 
State of Utah; and VIRGIL L. NORTON, 





BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, MEMORIAL GARDENS 
OF THE VALLEY, INC. 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DIS-
TRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH. HON-
ORABLE STEWART M. HANSON, JUDGE. 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc. agrees 
somewhat with the statement of the kind of case 
set forth in Appellant's Brief, however, there are 
matters upon which we feel we should comment. We 
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wish to point out that this Defendant-Respondent 
is not issuing or selling pre-need contracts through 
associates as stated in Appellant's Brief (A. B. 2). 
We do not believe that it necessarily follows 
that what the various Defendant-Respondents are 
doing will require the various morticians and funer-
al directors to follow a similar plan. Much of the 
business of funeral directors and morticians is non-
competitive by its very nature (AB-2). 
As a further comment in respect to this argu-
ment of Appellant, this Respondent cannot see that 
there is anything wrong with making it possible for 
people who have lost loved ones to arrange for funer-
al services at a savings when, perhaps, the breadwin-
ner of the family has been taken away. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was argued before the lower Court by 
the Plaintiffs as stated on pages 3 and 4 of its Brief. 
This Defendant in its presentation to the Court 
stated the following issues: 
A. That the Complaint does not state facts suf-
ficient to constitute a cause of action against Memo-
rial Gardens of the Valley, Inc. on the grounds that 
there is no juisticiable issue between Plaintiffs and 
the Defendants. 
B. That the provisions of Section 22-4-1, 
U.C.A., 1953 (1-7) are unconstitutional and violate 
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3 
the due process clauses of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah and the Federal Constitution. 
C. That this Defendant is neither a licensed 
embalmer or funeral director. 
D. That the "Family Security Agreement" of 
this Defendant is not an insurance contract. 
The final decree of the lower Court ( R-44, 48) 
sets forth the decision of the Court which decided 
in favor of the Defendant on constitutional grounds, 
but further decided that there did exist a justiciable 
issue between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This Defendant seeks a decision of this Court 
affirming the decision of the lower Court that the 
act is unconstitutional as found by the lower Court. 
This Respondent also seeks a ruling of this Court 
that there does not exist a justiciable issue between 
the Appellants and the Respondents. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. 
MEMORIAL GARDENS OF THE VALLEY, 
INC. IS NEITHER A FUNERAL DIRECTOR 
NOR AN EMBALMER ,AND ITS "FAMILY SE-
CURITY AGREEMENT" DOES NOT VIOLATE 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 58-9-10 AND 
58-9-22, U. C. A. 1953. 
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At page 3 of Appellant's Brief it is stated that 
Appellant asked for a declaration "that a licensed 
embalmer or funeral director performing services 
pursuant to a pre-need contract obtained by solici-
tation is guilty of unprofessional and unethical con-
duct." 
This statement is not accurate as to the Re-
spondent's position and particularly in respect to 
the operations of Memorial Gardens of the Valley, 
Inc., inasmuch as this company is not engaged either 
as an embalmer or as a funeral director. Memorial 
Gardens of the Valley, Inc., operates a cemetery. 
Our "Family Service Agreement" does not pro-
vide for embalming or for the directing of a funeral. 
The agreement provides only for the services ren-
dered by a cemetery, and the selling of a casket. 
Sub-paragraph A-8 of the Agreement provides: 
COMPLETE INTERMENT SERVICE: To 
provide, if enumerated as purchased, the open-
ing and closing of ________ graves upon the order 
of the Purchaser, his heirs or assigns only in 
the Company's Gardens. Said opening and 
closing of graves shall also include the use of 
the Memory Chapel or the chapel tent, lower-
ing device, greens, chairs, and other equip-
ment as is usually provided by the Company 
for this purpose. To record the name of the 
departed in the Perpetual Remembrance Book 
located in the Memory Chapel. 
·This provision of the Agreement does not pro-
vide for embalming, for funeral clothes, for funeral 
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cars or for other facilities, which might be necessary 
for the burial of the dead. Nor does it provide for 
a funeral director or for other persons to assist with 
the funeral. We have carefully read our Agreement 
and fail to find language which provides for these 
services as is claimed by Appellant. (AB-23) 
If a licensed mortician or embalmer should en-
gage in the solicitation of future funeral services, 
he might then come within the provisions of Sections 
59-9-10 and 22, U.C.A., 1953, which sets forth un-
professional and unethical conduct. Memorial Gar-
dens of the Valley, Inc., however, is not within this 
classification as it is neither an embalmer nor a 
funeral director, and is engaged in the conduct and 
operation of a cemetery and the incidental supplies 
and facilities which are necessary for the interment 
of a ·body. Furthermore, if Appellants desire a deci-
sion on this matter they should bring an action 
against one of their own members who might be 
soliciting funeral services, and not against this De-
fendant which does not ! 
The Appellant in its Brief (AB-11) states that 
the contract of Defendant, Memorial Gardens of the 
Valley agrees to do every act done by a licensed fu-
neral director and embalmer. Attention is called to 
the definition of the practice of embalming as found 
in Section 58-9-9, U.C.A., 1953, which is as follows: 
Either the embalming of dead human 
bodies, or the preparation for transportation 
of human bodies, dead of a contagious or in-
fectious disease, constitutes the practice of 
embalming. 
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The "Family Security Agreement" of the Mem-
orial Gardens of the Valley, Inc., in no place provides 
for such services as set forth and defined by the 
above statute. It does not mention embalming either 
directly or by inference. We cannot agree with the 
statement of Plaintiff's counsel that this Defendant 
agrees to do every act done by a licensed embalmer. 
Attention is also called to the provisions of Sec-
tion 58-9-14, U.C.A., 1953, which defines a funeral 
director as follows : 
"Funeral directors" mean and includes a 
person engaged ·in : 
(a) Preparing for burial or disposal and 
directing and s-upervising the burial or dis-
posing of dead human bodies, as a profession; 
(b) Maintaining or employed in a funer-
al establishment devoted to the care and prep-
aration for burial, transportation or other 
disposition of dead human bodies; and 
(c) Who shall, in connection with his 
name or funeral establishment, use the words 
"funeral director" or "undertaker" or "mor-
tician" or any other title implying that he is 
engaged as a "funeral director" as herein de-
fined. 
Nowhere within the "Family Security Agree-
ment" of Memorial Gardens of the Valley does there 
appear any language which might be interpreted 
to include the definitions as set forth in the above 
quoted statute. 
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The operations of Memorial Gardens of the 
Valley, Inc. with its "Family Security Agreement" 
is not that of solicitation of dead human bodies as 
described in Appellants' Brief, page 10, but it is 
that of the selling of interment spaces and a casket 
at a time when the parties to the agreement are not 
beset with grief during which time they might not 
be in a condition to give due consideration to the 
financial burdens or problems which might then 
exist. The sale by this Respondent is at a time when 
the parties to the agreement are able to fully and 
adequately consider the financial and other problems 
which are necessarily involved with the burial of 
a loved one. 
Appellant further argues (AB-12) that De-
fendants are violating the unprofessional conduct 
statute because the Defendants are "acting as 
agents, employees and representatives of the partic-
ular licensed funeral director and embalmer in-
volved." 
Appellant is reading into the contracts of the 
Defendants, and in particular into the "Family Se-
curity Agreement," of Memorial Gardens of the Val-
ley, Inc., some language which simply is not in the 
agreement. Nowhere can there be found language 
within the agreement which states that Memorial 
Gardens of the Valley, Inc., is acting as an agent, 
employee, or representative of a particular licensed 
funeral director, or of any licensed funeral direc-
tors, or embalmers. There is not any evidence that 
this Respondent is acting as an agent by express or 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
implied agreement for any licensed embalmer or fu-
neral director. We, therefore, submit that the argu-
ment of the Appellants in respect to any possible 
unethical conduct on the part of a licensed embalmer 
or funeral director is without merit in view of the 
contract or agreement of this Respondent and the 
pleadings which are before the Court. This matter 
came on before the Court on the Appellants' Motion 
For Summary Judgment. The evidence before the 
Court consisted of the pleadings and the contracts 
which are made part of the pleadings and this was 
the entire evidence before the Court at the time it 
rendered its decision. 
It is contended that there is agency by ratifi-
cation (AB-14). There is no agency by ratification 
in connection with the Memorial Gardens of the Val-
ley "Family Security Agreement" inasmuch as there 
is nothing sold to the purchaser other than that which 
is specified in the agreement sold by Memorial Gar-
dens of the Valley, Inc. There is nothing within the 
"Family Security Agreement" which controls the 
operations of a funeral director or embalmer, and 
there is nothing within the agreement which a fu-
neral director or embalmer must or can ratify. 
Appellants attempt to make the act of Mem-
orial Gardens of the Valley, Inc. in selling a "Fam-
ily Security Agreement," the act by ratification of 
some funeral director or embalmer. This argument 
is without substance as there is nothing within the 
agreement which points to a funeral director or em-
balmer. The argument as set forth by the Plaintiff 
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is without substance and is not factually true when 
considered with the agreement which is part of the 
record, and which is the only record before the Court 
as far as this Respondent is concerned. 
Point II. 
MEMORIAL GARDENS OF THE VALLEY'S 
AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR A TRUST SUF-
FICIENT TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC. 
We agree with the Plaintiff that. it is important 
and worthwhile to guaranty the performance of the 
contracts or agreements entered into by this Repond-
ent, and the other Respondents similarly concerned. 
We point with pride to the provisions of the "Family 
Security Agreement" of this Respondent (R-8) Sub-
section 8 which reads as follows : 
B. Guarantee of Performance: That in 
order to assure the performance of the de-
livery of merchandise and services covered by 
this agreement, the Company agrees that it 
will set aside in an irrevocable trust fund, 
sufficient money, based upon its present 
wholesale costs with reliable manufacturers, 
to pay for said merchandise and services when 
delivered. Any income or excess amounts over 
and above the actual costs of the merchandise 
and services will be paid to the Perpetual Care 
Trust Fund of Memorial Gardens of the Val-
ley, Inc. 
The provisions of the agreement of Memorial 
Gardens of the Valley, Inc., are in substantial agree-
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ment with the provisions of Section 22-4-1, U.C.A. 
. ' 1953. Such statutory regulation, however, must be 
reasonable. It is not necessary for the protection of 
the public to deposit the entire contract price in trust 
as the public is amply protected if the reasonable 
cost of the item which is purchased is deposited in 
trust, and the seller is allowed his normal selling 
commission or profit for services rendered in secur-
ing the agreement. It should be noted that paragraph 
"B" set out above provides that this Respondent 
agrees to set up in an irrevocable trust the money 
necessary and sufficient to fulfill its obligations un-
der the agreement. We do, however, wish to point 
out that to require this Respondent or any other 
party in a similar position to deposit the full amount 
of the purchase price or agreement in trust is a 
punitive measure and will in effect prevent the De-
fendant from engaging in a lawful business which 
is for the benefit of the Defendant and also for the 
benefit of the public as a whole. 
Point III 
THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE 
F A C T S SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
It is alleged by the Appellants that the business 
activities of the Respondents are, under the statutes, 
illegal, and that the agreements used by the Re-
spondents as alleged in securing business are in part 
insurance contracts and securities. Appellants allege 
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that the use of the said agreements require that the 
Respondents be licensed by the Securities Commis-
sion and by the Insurance Department of the State 
of Utah. 
The allegations of the Complaint do not make 
a justiciable issue between the Appellants and the 
Respondents of such a nature as to permit consider-
ation by this Court. The statutes relied upon by Ap-
pellants are regulatory statutes. If the Respondents 
are not conforming with the law, it is the State of 
Utah or its agencies which should proceed against 
those who might be considered to be violating the law. 
A declaratory action must be based on an ac-
tual controversy. The interest of the parties must 
be more than merely general. There must be a sub-
stantial present interest in the relief sought by the 
Complaint. See 17 4 ALR 550. 
The Appellants are not entitled to a declaratory 
judgment which, in effect would be to advise the 
officials of the Business Regulation Commission and 
the Commissioner of Insurance as to their duties 
and responsibilities. If this Respondent is considered 
to have violated one of the regulatory statutes of 
the State of Utah it should be the appropriate state 
official who should bring an action for the final de-
termination of such matters and not the Appellants 
herein. See Lyon vs. Bateman, 119 U. 435, 228 P.2d 
819, at 439 Utah. 
The type of justiciable controversy which 
must exist before declaratory relief can be 
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granted is defined in Section 8, on page 27, 
Anderson, Declaratory Judgments, as fol-
lows: 
''A controversy, in the sense in which the 
word is used in the Constitution in defining 
judicial power, particularly of the Federal 
Courts, must be one that· is appropriate for 
judicial determination as distinct from a dif-
ference or dispute of hypothetical or abstract 
character or from one which is academic or 
moot, but must be definite and concrete, 
touching the legal relation of the parties in 
adverse legal interest, and must be a real and 
substantial controversy admitting of specific 
relief through a decree conclusive in charac-
ter as distinct from an opinion or advice of 
what the law would be on a hypothetical state 
of facts." 
The facts argued by Appellants are hypothet-
ical and do not appear by the reading of the plead-
ings on file herein. Appellants are asking the Court 
to give an advisory opinion on a set of facts which 
are not in evidence and are hypothetical only. The 
United States Supreme Court has said: 
The requirements for a justiciable case 
for controversy are no less strict in a declara-
tory judgment proceeding than in any other 
type of suit. Alabama State Federation of La-
bor, Local Union No. 3, United Brotherhood 
of Carpenters and Joiners vs. McAdory, 65 
Supreme Court 1384, 1389. 
The Court also said in the same case that it is 
without power to give advisory opinions and that it 
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has been its "considered practice not to decide ab-
stract, hypothetical or contingent questions." 
Certainly the Plaintiff in this case is asking the 
Court to decide something which is contingent upon 
this Defendant doing something which is in viola-
tion of the law, and as of this time there is no evi-
dence to support such contention. 
See the Montana case of Waite vs. Holmes, 327 
P.2d. 399, 133 Mt. 512. In that case a licensed 
insurance agent brought an action against the state 
auditor as ex-officio insurance commissioner for the 
State of Montana, and the Canadian Insurance Com-
pany, which he claimed was operating in the State 
of Montana under a void license. He desired to have 
the license. revoked. 
The Court stated on page 402, P.2d: 
· Stated in the form of an interrogatory, 
Plaintiff's proposition may be phrased: Does 
.Plaintiff have any right to enjoin competition 
·which stems from a competitor operating un-
der a void license or franchise or a right to 
have such competitor's license cancelled or re-
voked? 
The Court held that the Plaintiff did not have 
any such right. It stated: 
Or, stated another way, the Plaintiffs 
had no property right which had been injured. 
Governed by the above rules, we can state the 
proposition thusly: If Plaintiff does not have 
a right to be free from the competition of the 
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Defendant, then any injury flowing from such 
competition is damnum absque injuria. 
The Court further stated at page 407 P.2d: 
. The Plaintiffs' right of action, therefore, 
falls squarely within the Restatement rule*** 
which states that where the purpose· of the 
statute is merely "police" regulation or super-
vision, then Plaintiff has no right of action. 
See also the case of Backman vs. Salt Lake 
County, 13 U.2d. 412-416, 375 P.2d. 756. In com4 
menting as to whether there was a justiciable con-
troversy in respect to an action for a declaratory 
judgment the Court said: 
We cannot see how there could be a true 
adversary proceeding under such circum-
stances. That is not to say that in a proper 
proceeding other than the type here, at which 
evidence might be adduced and findings made, 
the matter would be incontestible, - but sim-
ply that the Declaratory Judgments Act is not 
designed for giving advisory opinions in a 
non-adversary action, or to insure against 
feared risks. We reaffirm the language of 
Lyon vs. Bateman where we said: 
"While the statutes authorizing courts to 
render declaratory relief should be liberally 
construed in order to provide prompt settle-
ments of controversies and to stabilize uncer-
tain legal relations, courts, nevertheless, must 
operate within the constitutional and statu-
tory powers and duties imposed upon them. 
They are not supposed to be a forum for hear-
ing academic contentions or rendering ad-
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visory opinions. In order to maintain an ac-
tion for declaratory relief, plaintiffs must 
show that the justiciable and jurisdictional 
elements requisite in ordinary actions are 
present, and a judgment can be rendered o!llY 
in a real controversy between adverse parties. 
Generally, courts have held that the condi ... 
tions which must exist before a declaratory 
judgment action can be maintained are: ( 1) 
a justiciable controversy; ( 2) the interests 
of the parties must be adverse; ( 3) the party 
seeking such relief must have a legally pro-
tectible interest in the controversy; and ( 4) 
the issues between the parties involved must 
be ripe for judicial determination." 
Point IV 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 22-4-1, 
U.C.A., 1953 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND 
VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF 
THE STATE AND FEDERA.L CONSTITUTIONS. 
The provisions of Section 22-4-1 to 7, U.C.A. 
1953 ( 1963 Supp.) are not a valid exercise of the 
legislative power of the state in view of the provi-
sions of the Constitution of the State of Utah and 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States, and therefore are illegal and un-
constitutional. 
The pre-need act when considered as a whole is 
an unreasonable and arbitrary restriction which re-
sults in stifling or preventing the operation of an 
otherwise lawful business. All of which is done under 
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the cloak of a statutory regulation purportedly for 
the protection of the public. 
It is a violation of federal and state constitu-
tional provisions to enact unreasonable .and oppres-
sive regulatory measures. The general rule of law 
is well-stated in 11 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law 
paragraph 263: 
In the consideration of the relationship 
between the equal protection clause and the 
.police power of the states, the principle must 
be kept in mind that as in the regulation of 
all rights secured from infringement by Fed-
eral constitutional guaranties, it is settled 
that the police power is subordinate to the con-
stitutional guaranty of equality of privilege 
and of burden contained in this clause. There-
fore, any attempted exercise of police power 
which results in a denial of the equal.protec-
tion of the law is invalid. 
Under the limitations of the equal··pro-
tection clause, in order to· justify the inter-
position of the authority of the state in enact-
ing police regulations,. it must appear that 
the interests of the public generally as distin-
guished from those of a particular class re-
quire such interference, for it is a rule that 
police power cannot be invoked to protect one 
·class of citizens against another class unless 
such interference is for the real protection 
of society in general. 
A Utah case in which the Supreme Court of 
Utah considered a regulatory ordinance is Ritholz 
vs. City of Salt Lake 3 U 2d 385, 285 P.2d 702 at 706. 
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The Court held unconstitutional an .ordinance pro-
hibiting advertising of the prices of eyeglasses on 
the grounds that it did not constitute a proper exer-
cise ·of police power. In answer to the argument, as 
is here espoused, that such regulation was for the 
protection of the public the Court said: 
It should be noted that the law cannot 
be made, nor · could one be enforced, which 
would entirely ·protect the completely naive 
and gullible. In any event, if a customer de-
sires to use ordinary care adequate protection 
is afforded . . . 
The statutory regulations contained in the pre-
need law wherein one hundred percent of all money 
received on pre-need contracts is required to be 
placed in trust is confiscatory and deprives the De-
fendant of its property without due process of law. 
The requirement of the statute prevents the Defend-
ant from operating a legitimate business inasmuch 
as certain fixed expenses and the cost of acquisition 
of business must be paid. It discriminates against a 
particular mode of doing business, and inasmuch 
as it does not provide equal protection of the laws 
it is class legislation. 
See the case entitled: State vs. Memorial Gar-
dens Development Corp. (1957) 143 W.Va. 182, 
101 SE 2d. · 425, 68 ALR 2d. 1233. This case, which 
is the closest case in point involved a statute very 
similar to the Utah pre-need law, and which re-
quired all funds collected upon pre-need burial con-
tracts to be deposited in trust accounts for the bene-
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fit of policyholders and withdrawn only upon the 
death or demand of the insured, with the result that 
no money was available for operating expense or 
profit. The statute was held to be unconstitutional 
as unreasonably singling out and discriminating 
against an otherwise lawful business which the Court 
pointed out was not any more potentially fraudulent 
than any other merchandising business and as im-
pairing freedom of contract by discrimination be-
tween kinds and classes of businesses. The Court 
in State vs. Memorial Gardens Development Corp. 
had the following to say at 68 ALR 2d 1242 relative 
to the effect of the one hundred percent trust fund 
requirements: 
. The statute here involved which requires 
impounding of all purchase money has a pro-
hibitory rather than regulatory effect, be-
cause no one could without other types of busi-
ness or finances afford to engage in such 
business which allowed no expenditure of the 
funds for operational expenses ... 
The Court also had the following to say at 68 
ALR 2d. 1241-1242 relative to unfair classification 
or legislation and the resulting effect such legisla-
tion might have upon fair competition: 
· Although it may be to some degree popu-
lar to enact, and much may be said in favor 
of, laws protecting the unsuspecting and in-
competent in their purchases gullibly made 
of property for future delivery and the possi-
bility of vendors failing for one reason or an-
other to deliver, the provisions of the two 
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Constitutions contemplate and provide to all 
citizens freedom of contract so that any legis-
lative acts passed may not discriminate be-
tween kinds or classes of business which are 
considered legal. State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 
179, 10 SE 285, 6 LRA 621; Marlow v. Ring-
er, 79 W. Va. 568, 91 SE 386, LRA 1917D 
619; Koppers Coal Co. v. Compensation Com-
missioner, 123 W. Va. 621, 17 SE 2d. 330. 
Were it not for the protection thus afforded 
by the Constitution any small legitimate busi-
ness which could not protect itself by the vote 
of a majority of the legislative bodies could 
find itself unfairly and unjustly classified as 
illegal and its contracts void or its business 
so regulated as to destroy or impair it by rea-
son of a simple legislative declaration to the 
effect that it involved a matter affecting the 
public morals, public health or public welfare. 
So the reason for the constitutional provisions, 
the supreme law of the land, is very obvious. 
It is always unfortunate to some when fair 
competition seriously affects one's business, 
but that alone affords no legitimate reason 
for the requisition of the competitor. Fair and 
legal competition is generally more whole-
some and beneficial to the public than other-
wise, and should not be suppressed by impair-
ing or destructive legislation. 
See also the case entitled Memorial Trust, Inc. 
vs. Sam N. Beery, decided November 14, 1960, 356 
P.2d. 884, Colo. This was an action involving a regu-
tion based upon a statute providing that all funds 
received from the sale of prepaid funeral benefits 
should be invested in trust funds without allowance 
for acquisition costs. 
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Memorial entered into agreements by which it 
agreed to arrange for a mortuary to provide a cas-
ket selected. by the purchaser, and services incident 
to funerals. The contract provided that Memorial 
should retain 25 percent of the purchase price, and 
put the remaining 75 percent in trust. 
The Commissioner of Insurance brought an ac-
tion for a declaratory judgment. The Court held 
that the regulation adopted by the Commission was 
a nullity and that the statute in those particulars 
~as violative of due process and unconstitutional. 
The case in its holding struck down a one-hundred 
percent trust provision established by the regula-
tion, which was apparently consistent with the lan-
guage of the statute. 
Some reasonable regulation is probably advis-
able, but it appears to this Defendant that the one-
hundred percent trust fund regulation is so restric-
tive that it deprives one from engaging in business 
which is needed and desired by the citizens of the 
state. 
The provisions of Section 22-4-1, U.C.A., 1953 
( 1-7) are, in their effect, prohibitory, although on 
their face appear to be only regulatory. Under the 
Utah statute the contract is unenforceable by the 
party attempting to provide funeral services at a 
reasonable cost. The other contracting party can 
withdraw his money at any time; and as required 
by the statute, all the money must be held in trust. 
The right to contract is guaranteed to each citizen 
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of our country by the law, if the subject of the con-
tract is lawful and the public is not injured. 
See an excellent discussion of the constitutional 
rights of a citizen to contract in State vs. Gateway 
Mortuaries, Inc., 87 Montana 225, 287 P. 156, 
( 1930), where a statute rendered void a pre-ar-
ranged funeral which was not contracted in con~ 
templation of immediate death. The conviction of 
the Defendants by the lower Court was reversed by 
the Supreme Court of the State of Montana. 
The Montana court said at page 161 Pacific: 
Having found the act unreasonable, ar-
bitrary, and violative of the provisions of the 
constitutions of the United States and of this 
state, it is our duty to declare it void and we 
do without hesitation. 
The Respondent, Memorial Gardens of the Val-
ley; Inc., is engaged in enabling those who do busi-
ness with it to arrange for at least part of the con-
templated funeral expense at a time when they give 
due consideration to the expenditure contemplated. 
This is to be distinguished from the "at-need" pres-
sures surrounding the purchase of funeral arrange-
ments immediately upon the death of a loved one 
when perhaps far more elaborate and expensive mer-
chandise is sold than would have been purchased 
prior to need. Under such circumstances the pur-
chaser can be subject to unusual pressures and hasty 
decisions. It is our contention that pre-need agree-
ments are most beneficial and helpful under proper 
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supervision to the public as a whole. The contract-
ing for the sale of caskets, burial space, grave memo-
rials and for services in maintaining a cemetery on 
a pre-need basis fills the desires and needs of many 
people. It is not dishonorable or immoral. 
The requirement that all of the contract price 
be placed in trust goes far beyond reasonable regu-
lation under the police power. Its affect is to pro-
hibit a useful and needed business. A life insurance 
company or a casualty insurance company is not 
required to place in its reserves one-hundred percent 
of all premiums collected. It is allowed a reasonable 
operating and acquisition allowance. The national 
institutions are not required to maintain a hundred 
percent reserve. The reasonable and responsible way 
to provide for performance would be to require 
enough funds to be set aside to buy the merchandise 
at manufacturer's prices; this would guaranty per-
formance which should be the only object of any 
statute regulating a pre-need business. 
An enlightening and persuasive case is that of 
Prate Undertaking Company vs. State Board of Em-
balming, 55 R.I. 454, 182 Atl. 808, 104 A.L.R. 389, 
(1936). In this case the Supreme Court of the State 
of Rhode Island had for its consideration a statute 
which provided for the loss of a certificate to do 
bt1siness as an undertaker if one "participates in a 
like scheme or plan wherein there is contained any 
agreement or provision that deprives heirs or next 
of kin from freedom of choice as to the type or style 
or price of equipment used in connection with the 
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funeral, or the freedom of choice as to what funeral 
director shall be employed." The Court had the fol-
lowing to say at 104 ALR 399-400: 
A statute, or any part thereof, cannot 
be given effect, if under the guise of the police 
power in the public interest, but actually to 
bring about some object outside of the proper 
scope of that power, it arbitrarily or oppres-
sively interferes with a person or property 
in relation to recognized guaranteed rights. 
No good reason has been called to our atten-
tion, and none occurs to us, which makes it 
necessary in the interest of the general public 
that an individual, if he desires, should not 
be free to make a contract concerning the de-
tails of his own funeral with an undertaker 
who is conducting a burial association scheme 
or burial certificate plan, or that such under-
taker should not be able in like manner to 
enter into a binding contract with a person 
concerning the latter's funeral, without plac-
ing himself in a class of those not entitled to 
a certificate and therefore not able to do busi-
ness. The clause in question seems to go be-
yond the general purpose of the act in its 
relation to the public welfare. Mter careful 
consideration, and realizing fully the serious-
ness of our duty in passing upon the validity 
of an act of the Legislature, we are of the 
opinion that the part of Section 13 now under 
consideration constitutes an unreasonable and 
oppressive restriction upon the liberty of con-
tract secured by Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitu-
~ion, and that this part of the act in question 
Is clearly and palpably in excess of legislative 
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power, and therefore, that it is in violation 
of the provisions of said Fourteenth Amend-
ment and unconstitutional. 
We submit that the Utah pre-need statute has 
as its real purpose under the cloak of purported 
public interest, the stifling of the business activities 
of the Respondents herein. Although some reason-
able regulation might be desirable the present stat-
utes are not in the public's good. 
Point V 
THE AGREEMENT IS NOT AN INSUR-
ANCE CONTRACT. 
It is urged by Appellants that the "Agreement" 
of" this Respondent is an insurance contract and 
therefore should come under the supervision of the 
insurance department. This contention is not sup-
ported by our definition of insurance. 
Section 35-1-7, U.C.A., 1953, is as follows: 
Insurance is a contract whereby one un-
dertakes to indemnify another or pay or allow 
a specified or ascertainable amount or bene-
fit upon determinable risk contingencies. 
See the case of South Georgia Funeral Homes, Inc. 
vs. Harrison, Georgia 1936, 188 SE 529, in which 
case the Court discussed the principle of risk as it 
related to pre-need funeral contracts as follows: 
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The contract now being sold by the de-
fendant and by reason of the sale of which 
this contempt proceeding arose, is one where-
in the defendant corporation, for a fixed and 
definite sum in hand paid or payable in in-
stallments, agrees to render and perform or 
cause to be rendered and performed for the 
purchaser or any one of his family, certain 
funeral services. . . . While the performance 
of the contract is contingent upon death, this 
in and of itself does not make it a contract 
of life insurance, nor does the fact that the 
fixed sum is payable in installments. There 
is nothing in the contract itself nor is there 
any evidence to show that the amount paid by 
a purchaser is less than the value of the funer-
al services contracted to be performed, or that 
there is any element of risk involved, either 
on the part of the purchaser or the defendant 
corporation. The contract on its face does not 
appear to be one of life insurance. 
Examination of the "Family Security Agree-
ment" of this Respondent will show that it cannot 
be classified as an insurance contract. 
The Agreement requires that the one purchas-
ing the casket or burial space must pay a fixed and 
definite price. The price is the same regardless of 
the age of the contracting party or the condition of 
his health. There is no forgiveness feature by which 
Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc. would assume 
or forgive the balance which might be due upon the 
contract upon the death of the purchaser. 
The Agreement does not contemplate that de-
livery should be made after death, but the agreement 
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sets out that upon receipt of the full sum and upon 
the request of the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, 
it agrees to convey the contemplated property or 
merchandise. 
Even under the provisions of the pre-need law, 
with which we do not agree, the agreement may be 
revoked at any time by the purchaser and, in that 
event, all amounts paid by him under the contract 
must be refunded. 
Another feature which distinguishes the agree-
ment from an insurance contract is that the pur-
chaser shall have the right "at any time to sell or 
transfer his interest herein, as evidenced by an in-
terment deed or bill of sale which is to be issued." 
Such a provision is certainly not the provision of an 
insurance contract. 
The agreement also provides that there shall 
be placed in a trust, sufficient money based upon 
wholesale costs to pay for the merchandise and serv-
ices when delivered. 
There was no intent on the part of the legis-
lature to place the control of the cemetery or mor-
tuary business or the sale of caskets or other burial 
supplies under the control of the insurance commis-
sioner when the statutes referred to were enacted. 
There is no ·reference in the insurance code to such 
contracts or agreements although the insurance code 
was devised and adopted by the 1963 session of the 
legislature. 
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The pre-need statute in effect negates the 
thought that such agreements are insurance con-
tracts. Section 22-4-6, U.C.A. 1953, 1963 Supple-
ment, which is a part of the pre-need law, is as 
follows: 
This act shall not apply to or affect the 
operations and business of duly licensed asso-
ciations or companies under the insurance 
laws of the State of Utah. 
The legislature recognized that there were or-
ganizations which were under the insurance laws 
but it would appear that it felt that the pre-need 
arrangements were different and that they should 
come under the provisions of the special pre-need 
statute. The statute was tailored for those situations 
in which individuals might wish to arrange for and 
pay for at least part of the cost of a funeral prior 
to the actual need. 
See the case entitled Barveler vs. Oregon Physi-
cian's Service, 194 Ore. 659, 243 P.2d 1050 (1952) 
in which case the Court found the hospital associa-
tion not subject to the provisions of the general in-
surance code inasmuch as hospital associations were 
covered under a separate statute. Such is the case 
here. 
CONCLUSION 
There exists no justiciable issue between the 
Plaintiff and Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc. 
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The "Family Security Agreement" is not an insur-
ance policy and does not come under the jurisdiction 
of the Instlrance Department of the State of Utah. 
The pr.e-nee.d law passed by the legislature is uncon-
stitutional and void. It is an attempt to stifle and 
prevent a legitimate and much needed service to the 
public. 
The Court should affirm the decision of the 
lower Court and declare Section 22-4-1 to 7, U.C.A., 
( 1963 Sup.) unconstitutional and void. 
Respectfully submitted 
CHARLES WELCH, JR. 
J. LAMBERT GIBSON 
Lamoreaux & Gibson 
Attorneys for Memorial 
Gardens of the Valley, Inc. 
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